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SPIRITED DEBATE:
A COMMENT ON EDWARD B. FOLEY'S
JURISPRUDENCE AND THEOLOGY
Perry Dane*
A T the beginning of his paper, Professor Edward Foley invites us
to imagine that the preamble to the Constitution were amended
to read: "We the People of the United States, devoutly recognizing the
authority and law of Jesus Christ the Savior and King of Nations, in
Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice.. .."I
What makes so many of us shudder at that thought? What would
make so many of us shudder at even a milder invocation of God?
What would make many of shudder even if those words would not
offend us religiously?2
Foley suggests that one reason we would shudder is that such a pre-
amble would invoke a theological basis for law.' And it is precisely
such a theological basis for law that Foley's paper urges us to avoid.
I.
Some of the issues here are hermeneutical. It might matter, for ex-
ample, precisely how such proposed language would affect the actual
legal construction of the role of religion in jurisprudence, state, and
society. For instance, the Constitution of Ireland begins:
In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority
and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States
must be referred,
We, the people of tire,
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord,
Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial
4
* Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, Camden. This Comment is an ex-
panded version, within the page constraints set by the editors of the Fordham Law
Review, of the oral response I delivered during the interfaith conference on -The
Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work."
1. Edward B. Foley, Jurisprudence and Theology, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 1195,
1195 (1998) (citing Anson Phelps Stokes, 3 Church and State in the United States 589
(1950)).
2. As a Jew, for example, replacing "Jesus Christ the Savior and King of Nations"
with the more religiously congenial "Hashem, our God and the God of our forbears"
would only marginally change my reaction to the amendment, and not necessarily for
the better.
3. Foley, supra note 1, at 1195.
4. Ir. Const. preamble. The preamble continues:
Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the
rightful independence of our Nation,
And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Pru-
dence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual
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The Irish Constitution also provides that: "The State acknowledges
that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall
hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect and honour religion." 5
Yet this same constitution emphasizes that "[f]reedom of conscience
and the free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public
order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen,"' 6 that the State may
not "endow any religion,"7 that the "State shall not impose any disa-
bilities or make any discrimination on the ground of religious profes-
sion, belief or status,"8 and so on.9
More to the point, in a landmark decision of the Irish Supreme
Court, McGee v. Attorney General, which invalidated laws prohibiting
the sale or import of contraceptives, one of the judges spoke about the
relation of theology and law in words strikingly like Foley's own.
While acknowledging that, in principle, the personal rights guaranteed
by the Irish Constitution had roots in a religious notion of natural law,
the opinion emphasized that:
In a pluralist society such as ours, the Courts cannot as a matter of
constitutional law be asked to choose between the differing views,
where they exist, of experts on the interpretation by the different
religious denominations of either the nature or extent of these natu-
ral rights as they are to be found in the natural law .... In this
may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our country restored,
and concord established with other nations,
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.
Id. The language quoted both complements and counterpoints the more restrained
words of Article 6 of the Irish Constitution regarding the nature of the state:
1. All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive,
under God, from the people, whose right it is to designate the rulers of the
State and, in final appeal, to decide all questions of national policy, accord-
ing to the requirements of the common good.
2. These powers of government are exercisable only by or on the authority
of the organs of State established by this Constitution.
Id. art. 6.
5. Id. art. 44.1. The original version of this provision contained two other subsec-
tions, which were repealed when Ireland joined the then-European Community:
2. The State recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic
and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great ma-
jority of the citizens.
3. The State also recognises the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian
Church in Ireland, the Methodist Church in Ireland, the Religious Society of
Friends in Ireland, as well as the Jewish Congregations and the other reli-
gious denominations existing in Ireland at the date of the coming into opera-
tion of this Constitution.
Ir. Const. art. 44.1.2-3 (repealed).
6. Ir. Const. art. 44.2.1.
7. Id. art. 44.2.2.
8. Id. art. 44.2.3.
9. The remainder of Article 44 contains more specific guarantees, including for-
bidding discrimination in aid to religious schools, requiring that students attending
religious schools receiving public money not be compelled to religious instruction in
that school, and preserving the right of religious denominations to manage their own
affairs. Id. art. 44.2.4-6.
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country it falls finally upon the judges to interpret the Constitution
and in doing so to determine, where necessary, the rights which are
superior or antecedent to positive law or which are imprescriptible
or inalienable.
10
Indeed, the bulk of the Irish court saw itself, despite the profound
differences between the Irish and United States Constitutions, as nev-
ertheless engaged in a project in the same spirit as the United States
Supreme Court's efforts to grapple with similar questions in cases such
as Griswold v. Connecticut."
Another, narrower but more pointed, hermeneutic question about
Foley's hypothetical change to the preamble is how to read it in pari
materia with the rest of the preamble. What could it mean, after all, to
"recognize the authority and law of Jesus Christ the Savior and King
of Nations" while also setting out to "form a more perfect Union, es-
tablish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,.. . and secure the Bless-
ings of Liberty?"' 2 Would such a preamble give a theological basis for
law, or would it construct a legal discourse that subsumes theology
into a political ethic? Consider by way of comparison here not only
the Irish Constitution, but also, for example, Israeli law's electrifying
but incurably uncertain efforts to call upon "the values of the State of
Israel as a Jewish and democratic state"'13 and "the principles of free-
dom, justice, equity and peace of [Judaism's] heritage. "4
10. [1974] I.R. 284, 318 (Walsh, J.). One commentator argues specifically that,
"[iln a way, the McGee Court was enunciating a Rawlsian concept of political theory,
recognizing that where religio-legal consensus does not exist, the law must refrain
from acting on religious motives." S.I. Strong, Christian Constitutions: Do They Pro-
tect Internationally Recognized Human Rights and Minimize the Potential for Violence
Within A Society? A Comparative Analysis of American and Irish Constitutional Law
and Their Religious Elements, 29 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L 1, 69 (1997).
I do not mean to argue, from this one case, that the religious language in the Irish
constitution is insignificant or benign. Indeed, any serious discussion of Irish constitu-
tional law and theory is well beyond the scope of this Comment. (For one useful
account, see Gerard Whyte, Religion and the Irish Constitution, 30 J. Marshall L Rev.
725 (1997)). I am only making the much narrower claim that the particular language
of the Irish Constitution, effusive as it is in its apparent religious commitment, does
not in itself foreclose the same hermeneutical questions about the place of religion
that every legal system from time to time must face.
11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see McGee, [19741 I.R. at 319 (Walsh, J.); id. at 327-29
(Henchy, J.); id. at 335-36 (Griffin., J.). Even the dissenting justice engaged the
American cases, if only to distinguish them. Id at 303-04 (Fitzgerald, CJ., dissenting).
12. U.S. Const. preamble.
13. Israel Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, translated in International
Constitutional Law (visited Feb. 20, 1998) <httpJ/www.uni-wuerzburg.deilaw/
isl2000_.html> provides that:
Basic human rights in Israel are based on the recognition of the value of the
human being, and the sanctity of his life and his freedom .....
The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in
order to anchor in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish
and democratic state.
14. Israel's Foundations of Law Act of 1980 provides that "[wlhere the court,




To be sure, dwelling on these interpretive puzzles is not entirely fair
to Foley, for whom the preamble hypothetical is only a hook or teaser
for his larger philosophical point. I do have a reason for raising such
questions, to which I will return. For now, though, let me get to Fo-
ley's real interest, his critique of efforts to give a "theological basis for
law."
What, then, precisely, is wrong with a "theological basis for law?"
Foley's critical argument is this: "[T]heology is different from other
matters. One cannot convince an atheist to believe in God on the
basis of reasoned argument. Similarly, one cannot convince a theist to
abandon her belief in God. In this sense, theological convictions are
beyond reason."' 5 Just as important, Foley says, appealing to theolog-
ical convictions is largely unnecessary. If natural law is what we want,
we can get it through overlapping consensus.
This is, of course, well worn philosophical ground. We have heard
endless permutations of this very debate, and I am not sure that either
Foley or any of the respondents can say much that is new about it,
particularly given the length constraints of this symposium. 16 Never-
theless, two categories of response are in order.17
case-law or by analogy, it shall decide it in the light of the principles of freedom,
justice, equity and peace of Israel's heritage." Foundations of Law Act, 1980, trans-
lated in 34 L.S.I. 181 (1979-80). The word "Israel" in this context refers to the Jewish
people and their tradition, not to the State of Israel.
15. Foley, supra note 1, at 1205.
16. A partial list of compulsory citations, on various sides of the debate, might
include, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law (1983);
Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980); Kent Greenawalt, Pri-
vate Consciences and Public Reasons (1995); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions
and Political Choice (1988); Michael J. Perry, Love and Power: The Role of Religion
and Morality in American Politics (1991); John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993);
David Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope (1987); Harold
J. Berman, Law and Logos, 44 DePaul L. Rev. 143 (1994); Stephen L. Carter, The
Religiously Devout Judge, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 932 (1989); Kent Greenawalt, Reli-
gious Convictions and Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts, 39 DePaul L. Rev.
1019 (1990); Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 21
(1996); Emily Fowler Hartigan, Multiple Unities in the Law, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 999
(1995); Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
215 (1987); Michael J. Perry, Religious Arguments in Public Political Debate, 29 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 1421 (1996); Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Political Choice:
Further Thoughts-And Second Thoughts-On Love and Power, 30 San Diego L.
Rev. 703 (1993); R. Randall Rainey, Law and Religion: Is Reconciliation Still Possi-
ble?, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 147, 150-51 (1993); John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping
Consensus, 7 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1 (1987); Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case
of Epistemic Abstinence, 19 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3 (1990); Richard Rorty, Religion as
Conversation-Stopper, 3 Common Knowledge 1 (1994); Jeremy Waldron, Religious
Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 San Diego L. Rev. 817 (1993); Michael J.
Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1765 (1994) (reviewing John Rawls,
Political Liberalism (1993)).
17. Foley suggests that he and I "apparently agree" on the fundamental normative
proposition that "the Constitution (or judicial opinions) of a society" should not "take
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The first of these categories goes to the place of religion in political
and moral discourse. Consider, to begin with, that despite Foley's
claims, theological arguments are not beyond reason." Can an atheist
be convinced to believe in God on the basis of reasoned argument?
Of course. Can a believer be convinced to abandon belief in God? Of
course. Rational arguments about religion have been traded back and
forth for centuries. For that matter, tales of reasoned conversion,
either away from religious faith or toward it, are a staple of a certain
strain of intellectual autobiography. Bertrand Russell 9 and C.S.
Lewis,' respectively, are only two of the most prominent recent elo-
quent examples.
sides on theological disputes." Foley, supra note 1, at 1196 n.5. To be sure, I do em-
brace, as does Foley, the separationist imperative in American legal and constitutional
practice. But my Comment also sets out, among other things, to: (1) dispute Foley's
claim that "theological disputes" are different, at least in the way he thinks they are,
from other disputes; (2) point out that, given the complex dynamics of theological
disputes, "taking sides" in a such disputes might sometimes be more respectful, even
to the losing side, than appealing to a thin "overlapping consensus"; (3) suggest some
deep hermeneutical and jurisprudential puzzlement about exactly what it would mean
for a legal discourse to "take sides on theological disputes"; and (4) argue that the
American attitude to the role of religious arguments in law is, at least in part, histori-
cally and culturally contingent, and itself premised on specific, controversial, theologi-
cal propositions.
18. I could cite hundreds of volumes in the philosophy of religion. But for a clas-
sic and powerful discussion in the legal literature, see Stephen L Carter, Evolution-
ism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 Duke LJ. 977.
19. Russell's account is splendidly succinct. Russell had been taught the Unitarian
faith at home, and was a believer until the age of fifteen. Then, he reports:
I began a systematic investigation of the supposed rational arguments in fa-
vour of fundamental Christian beliefs.... I found, however, that the reasons
given in favour of these dogmas were very unconvincing. I considered them
one at a time with great seriousness. The first to go was freewill. At the age
of fifteen, I became convinced that the motions of matter, whether living or
dead, proceeded entirely in accordance with the laws of dynamics, and there-
fore the will can have no influence upon the body.... I should have found
intellectual satisfaction in becoming a materialist, but on grounds almost
identical with those of Descartes (who was unknown to me except as the
inventor of Cartesian co-ordinates), I came to the conclusion that conscious-
ness is an undeniable datum, and therefore pure materialism is impossible.
This was at the age of fifteen. About two years later, I became convinced
that there is no life after death, but I still believed in God, because the "First
Cause" argument appeared to be irrefutable. At the age of eighteen, how-
ever, shortly before I went to Cambridge, I read Mill's Autobiography,
where I found a sentence to the effect that his father taught him that the
question "Who made me?" cannot be answered, since it immediately sug-
gests the further question "Who made God?" This led me to abandon the
"First Cause" argument, and to become an atheist. Throughout the long
period of religious doubt, I had been rendered very unhappy by the gradual
loss of belief, but when the process was completed, I found to my surprise
that I was quite glad to be done with the whole subject.
Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell 47-48 (1967).
20. Lewis devotes much of his memoir Surprised by Joy to his transition from
childish belief to sophisticated atheism to committed Christianity. I can only give
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Moreover, to the extent that religion is beyond reason, it is not
much more beyond reason than other beliefs we hold. Can a liberta-
some of the flavor of his reflections on the latter stages of this process, and its power-
ful synthesis of rational argument and sudden conviction:
In reading Chesterton, as in reading MacDonald, I did not know what I was
letting myself in for. A young man who wishes to remain a sound Atheist
cannot be too careful of his reading....
.... I had been trying to defend [philosophical realism] ever since I began
reading philosophy .... I wanted Nature to be quite independent of our
observation; something other, indifferent, self-existing. . . . But now, it
seemed to me, I had to give that up. Unless I were to accept an unbelievable
alternative, I must admit that mind was no late-come epiphenomenon; that
the whole universe was, in the last resort, mental; that our logic was partici-
pation in a cosmic Logos.
It is astonishing (at this time of day) that I could regard this position as
something quite distinct from Theism....
.... I read in Alexander's Space Time and Deity his theory of "Enjoyment"
and "Contemplation."...
I accepted this distinction at once and have ever since regarded it as an indis-
pensable tool of thought. A moment later its consequences-for me quite
catastrophic-began to appear. It seemed to me self-evident that one essen-
tial property of love, hate, fear, hope, or desire was attention to their
object....
•.. I did not yet ask, Who is the desired? only What is it? But this brought
me already into the region of awe ....
That was the second Move; equivalent, perhaps, to the loss of one's last re-
maining bishop. The third Move... consisted merely in linking up this new
iclaircissement about Joy with my idealistic philosophy....
The fourth Move was more alarming.... I was driven back into something
like Berkeleyanism; but Berkeleyanism with a few top dressings of my own.
I distinguished [the] philosophical "God" very sharply (or so I said) from
"the God of popular religion." There was, I explained, no possibility of be-
ing in a personal relation with Him. ...
.... In the Trinity Term of 1929 1 gave in, and admitted that God was God,
and knelt and prayed: perhaps, that night, the most dejected and reluctant
convert in all England ....
... [This] conversion... was only to Theism ... not to Christianity....
.... The God whom I had at last acknowledged was one, and was right-
eous .... Where was [religion] full grown? . .. There were really only two
answers possible: either in Hinduism or in Christianity. ...
Every step I had taken, from the Absolute to "Spirit" and from "Spirit" to
"God," had been a step toward the more concrete, the more imminent, the
more compulsive.... I know very well when, but hardly how, the final step
was taken. I was driven to Whipsnade one sunny morning. When we set out
I did not believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, and when we reached
the zoo I did.
C.S. Lewis, Surprised By Joy: The Shape of My Early Life 191, 209, 217-18, 221-23,
228-30, 235, 237 (1956).
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nan become a democratic socialist on the basis of reasoned argument?
It's hard. Can a Westsider become an Eastsider?2' Harder yet.
Even if theological premises are beyond argument, and distinctively
so, that is still not the end of it. In Foley's model of discourse, inter-
locutors who hold irreconcilable theological premises can only really
hope to be moved by each other's specific policy prescriptions to the
extent that each can bracket those premises and rely instead on the
common language of an overlapping consensus. But this is a flat, al-
gorithmic, account of human political and legal conversation.' An
atheist, while remaining an atheist, can find a religiously-rooted argu-
ment compelling in its religiosity, not in spite of it. A believer, while
remaining a believer, can find an atheist's argument compelling in its
atheism. Even when such engagement cannot compel, it can still help
define and clarify and hone. The thinking believer will be brave
enough to face the atheist's arguments direcfly. And the thinking sec-
ularist will recognize the religious resonance of her own commitments.
Finally, Foley's argument assumes that when any one of us loses a
public debate, we would rather lose to arguments rooted in the "over-
lapping consensus" than to arguments rooted in a contrary theology.
But this is not always true. Theological arguments, while often divi-
sive, also sometimes bear a distinctive, and potentially mollifying,
stamp of disinterestedness and good faith.23 Moreover, depth itself-
whether or not that depth is one's own-has its legitimate appeals,
both to our intellect and our psyche. Thus, for example, a serious
21. This is an inside joke. See Joseph A. O'Hare., SJ., President of Fordham Uni-
versity, Welcoming Remarks at "The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: An
Interfaith Conference" (June 1, 1997) (humorously discussing differences between
West Side and East Side New Yorkers).
22. Foley looks to the abortion controversy as an obvious test for his prescriptions.
Foley, supra note 1, at 1210. Like many others, he finds the debate, at some level,
intractable, but argues that the least unsatisfactory solution is to bracket theological
beliefs and "punt by invoking the existence of an overlapping consensus." Id. at 1211.
But, tellingly, the ground rules he suggests are not the ones employed by the Com-
mon Ground Network for Life and Choice, the most noted real-world effort at engag-
ing pro-life and pro-choice activists in genuine dialogue. Common Ground dialogues
do search for points of overlap among antagonists, both as to their respective values
and as to specific policy goals. But these dialogues do not require that participants
leave their deep commitments at the door. Rather, the organization's ground rules
focus on such conversational norms as avoiding clichd and fixed rhetoric and striving
for "dialogue" rather than "debate," and such interpersonal norms as mutual respect.
See Mary Jacksteit & Adrienne Kaufmann, Finding Common Ground in the Abortion
Conflict: A Manual (1995).
23. Cf Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft (Douglas Johnston &
Cynthia Sampson eds., 1994) (collection of essays discussing the often underestimated
role of religion in mediating or resolving ethnic, political, and international disputes).
24. Jeremy Waldron puts it this way:
I mean to draw attention to an experience we all have had at one time or
another, of having argued with someone whose world view was quite at odds
with our own, and of having come away thinking, -I'm sure he's wrong, and I
can't follow much of it, but, still, it makes you think .... The prospect of
losing that sort of effect in public discourse is, frankly, frightening-terri-
1998] 1219
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Jew might prefer a "Christian America," in at least some respects, to
an uncommitted America.25 And the very search for overlapping con-
sensus can obscure not only irreconcilable difference, which Foley ad-
mits, 26 but also irreconcilable paradox. Thus, a serious Christian
might prefer a manifestly secular America to one that tried to trans-
late the Christian's transcendent, redemptive, categories into their
merely "cultural" analogues in the overlapping consensus. 2
7
III.
The real problem with Foley's argument, however, might be else-
where. Our topic, after all, is not the place of religion in political de-
bate, or in public conversation generally. It is, more narrowly, the
place of religion in the law. And doing justice to that topic requires
taking into account two complementary features of the legal
imagination.
First, any legal discourse is peculiarly particular. Foley is hoping to
point us to a common normative language. But judges and lawyers do
fying, even, if we are to imagine it being replaced by a form of "delibera-
tion" that, in the name of "fairness" or "reasonableness" . . . consists of
bland appeals to harmless nostrums that are accepted without question on
all sides. That is to imagine open-ended public debate reduced to the formal
trivia of American television networks.
Waldron, supra note 16, at 842.
25. Cf Elliott Abrams, Faith or Fear: How Jews Can Survive in a Christian
America (1996) (discussing how the marginalization of religion in society has weak-
ened rather that strengthened Jewish faith). The claim in the text is, to be fair, not
exactly Abrams's position, though it comes close. It is, incidentally, emphatically not
mine, though I understand it.
J. David Bleich, a prominent rabbi and legal scholar, has offered the following pro-
vocative, but nuanced, variation on the theme:
I frankly regard the First Amendment as a failed experiment. Yet, I hasten
to add that I would not want to live in a society that does not boast of a First
Amendment or a functional equivalent thereof. But the desire for the pro-
tection afforded by the First Amendment should not prevent us from recog-
nizing that neither of its clauses always achieved the effect we want.
My own reaction to Justice Brewer's declaration [that "this is a Christian
nation"] in Church of the Holy Trinity, is: "Amen. Would that the United
States were indeed a Christian nation!" However, as a Jew who is also a
member of a law school faculty, I find it necessary to append an "oral law"
interpretation. The interpretation may be found in the last scene of the play
Nathan the Wise by the German poet Lessing in which Nathan is told: "Na-
than, Nathan, indeed you are a Christian." To this Nathan responds by say-
ing, "That which you call a Christian in me, I call a Jew in you." Or, as
Justice Douglas put it succinctly in Zorach v. Clausen, "We are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." To be effective in
the public square, religion need not, and should not, be sectarian in nature.
J. David Bleich, Godtalk: Should Religion Inform Public Debate?, 29 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 1513, 1517-18 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
26. Foley, supra note 1, at 1210-11.
27. The classic discussion of some of these themes can be found in H. Richard
Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (1951).
[Vol. 661220
POLITICAL THEORY
not set out to make universal arguments that could potentially con-
vince all members of the community. Instead, they make specific ar-
guments within the context of, and subject to the constraints of, a
particular legal tradition. The best judges and lawyers challenge and
reconfigure those constraints, but they never forget that every legal
system is a situated language, with a specific grammar and vocabulary.
Each legal system has its own modes of practice, habits of analysis,
and resonant narratives. In this sense, every legal tradition, even leav-
ing religion out of the equation, is contingent and sectarian, and no
amount of recourse to overlapping consensus can change that.
Second, legal discourse is relatively autonomous. Earlier, I argued
that Foley's hypothetical rewriting of the preamble to the United
States Constitution would raise rather than foreclose or answer impor-
tant hermeneutic questions about the place of religion in the law. The
larger point, however, is that to whatever extent religion and religious
(or anti-religious) views are inserted, explicitly or implicitly, into the
legal conversation, the law will understand them, just as it understands
Rawlsianism and Pareto economics and all the other ingredients of
our larger normative field, through its own categories and practices.'
I am not arguing, to be sure, that theological commitments expressed
in legal sources, or relied on by judges and lawyers, make no differ-
ence. But I do propose that, whatever role theology plays in law, it is
more complicated, and mediated, than simply providing a "theological
basis" for law.29 In one sense, but a deep and important sense, law-
as a practice and a hermeneutic-can no more have a theological "ba-
sis" than any other "basis".30
IV.
What, then, makes us shudder at Foley's hypothetical, or even a
diluted version of it? If the overriding theme of my critique so far has
been a plea to recognize contingency and particularity, then the an-
swer or answers to that question must also be contingent and
particular.
28. Cf Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth (1996) (arguing that, while the forms of
legal argument can be diverse, legal "truth" is a product of the grammar of legal
justification, and is not a matter of correspondence to any normative standard exter-
nal to the practice of legal discourse itself).
29. For my own efforts at suggesting the relative autonomy of even explicitly reli-
gious law, see Perry Dane, The Yoke of Heaven, The Question of Sinai, and the Life of
Law, 44 U. Toronto LJ. 353 (1994); Perry Dane, The Oral Law and the Jurispndence
of a Textless Text, S'vara: A Journal of Philosophy, Law, and Judaism, Winter 1991, at
11.
30. Interestingly, Foley's argument that legal discourse can and should proceed on
the basis of an "overlapping consensus" unmoored from deeper theological and philo-
sophical commitments is at least an implicit acknowledgment of the relative auton-
omy of law. But my claim here is that the very nature of legal discourse, as much as
any explicit effort to exclude certain forms of argument, serves to insulate law, to
some degree at least, from such commitments.
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Recall once more that many constitutions do invoke God. I am not
just speaking of the Irish and Israeli texts I quoted earlier. The Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms invokes God,31 and Canada-
more clearly and resolutely than either Ireland or Israel-still stands
as a liberal, democratic, even secular state. Or consider the new Po-
lish constitution, which also invokes God, but in a remarkably inter-
esting, open-ended, aggressively tolerant, way that might well speak
better and more honestly of modem Poland than mere silence
would.32 Our own Declaration of Independence invoked God,33 and
in 1776 that made sense too.
34
31. "Whereas Canada is founded upon the principles that recognize the
supremacy of God and the rule of law." Can. Const. (Constitution Act 1982) pt. I
(Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), preamble.
32. The 1997 Constitution, a revamped product of post-Communist Poland,
begins:
Having regard for the existence and future of our Homeland, Which recov-
ered, in 1989, the possibility of a sovereign and democratic determination of
its fate, We, the Polish Nation-all citizens of the Republic, Both those who
believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, As well as
those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising
from other sources, Equal in rights and obligations towards the common
good-Poland, Beholden to our ancestors for their labours, their struggle for
independence achieved at great sacrifice, for our culture rooted in the Chris-
tian heritage of the Nation and in universal human values, Recalling the best
traditions of the First and the Second Republic, Obliged to bequeath to fu-
ture generations all that is valuable from our over one thousand years' heri-
tage, Bound in community with our compatriots dispersed throughout the
world, Aware of the need for cooperation with all countries for the good of
the Human Family, Mindful of the bitter experiences of the times when fun-
damental freedoms and human rights were violated in our Homeland, Desir-
ing to guarantee the rights of the citizens for all time, and to ensure diligence
and efficiency in the work of public bodies, Recognizing our responsibility
before God or our own consciences, Hereby establish this Constitution of the
Republic of Poland as the basic law for the State, based on respect for free-
dom and justice, cooperation between the public powers, social dialogue as
well as on the principle of aiding in the strengthening the powers of citizens
and their communities.
Poland Const. preamble, translated in International Constitutional Law (visited Feb.
20, 1998) <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/plOOOOO_.html#I000_> (emphases
added).
Foley lauds this language "as invoking precisely the kind of 'overlapping consen-
sus"' that he advocates. Foley, supra note 1, at 1196 n.5. But it is much better under-
stood as an effort, whose success is still uncertain, at compromising a particular
ideological rift that has arisen in the specific historical moment of post-Communist
Poland. See Anthony Barker, Constitution Battle Stirs Poles Before Elections, Reuters
World Service, May 21, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. It
seems to me that if an effort were made to insert similar language in the United States
Constitution, its resonance would be quite different.
33. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776) ("the Laws of Nature
and of Nature's God"); id. para. 32 ("Supreme Judge of the world").
34. Consider in this respect E. Gregory Wallace's observation that the Declara-
tion's invocation of divine authority and judgment is consistent with James Madison's
theological belief, crucial to his opposition to the establishment of religion, in a "citi-
zen's prepolitical duty to God." E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Relig-
iously, 21 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1183, 1240 (1994). Wallace's insight nicely refutes both
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So what makes us shudder? First, because in our own time and con-
text, amending the preamble would not be an effort to ground princi-
ples of natural law in a divine mandate. It would, rather, be a harsh,
politically and religiously debasing, escalation of a certain form of
identity politics.35
Second, putting God in the Constitution or our legal discourse now
would mark the end of the amazing, distinctively American experi-
ment in nurturing a religious society by way of a secular govern-
ment.36 That experiment was founded on a set of arguments we can
find in James Madison's Remonstrance, and elsewhere. 37 Some of
these arguments are political and moral. Some are pragmatic. And
some are expressly theological-yes, theological. 38  Together, they
those who would ignore the references to God in the Declaration and those who
would use those reference to counter or downplay the striking and significant lack of
references to God in the Constitution.
35. Cf. David H. Bennett, The Party of Fear: From Nativist Movements to the
New Right in American History (1988) (finding parallels between traditional nativism
and contemporary religious conservatism in the American political scene); David
Frum, Dead Right (1994) (arguing that certain aspects of contemporary conservatism
express, in their own way, the same sort of "identity politics" usually associated with
modem left-wing politics); David AJ. Richards, Sexual Preference as a Suspect (Reli-
gious) Classification An Alternative Perspective on the Unconstitutionality of Anti-
Lesbian/Gay Initiatives, 55 Ohio St. L.J. 491, 542 (1994) (arguing that religiously-
based opposition to homosexual rights "engages in a politics of identity, based on the
paradox of intolerance").
The actual movement to insert language about "the authority and law of Jesus
Christ" in the Constitution originally arose in the specific political and theological
climate of the second half of the nineteenth century. See Daniel L. Dreisbach, In
Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of Selected Nineteenth-Cen-
tury Commentaries on References to God and the Christian Religion in fie United
States Constitution, 48 Baylor L. Rev. 927, 934-35 n.20 (1996) (discussing and citing
extensive historical literature on the "National Reform Association" and its effort to
enact the "Christian Amendment"). For discussions of more recent efforts along simi-
lar lines, see Mark Silk, Spiritual Politics: Religion and American Since World War 11,
at 99-100 (1988); Anson Shupe, The Reconstructionist Movement on the New Christian
Right, 106 Christian Century 880 (1989).
36. For another view of the nature of that experiment, see Christopher L Eis-
gruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Order, 89 N.W. L
Rev. 347 (1995).
37. See James Madison, "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments," reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, app. at 63-72 (1947). For
my purposes here, I am treating Madison's Remonstrance as a canonical text of our
constitutional theory. I do not, of course, claim that it provides a historically or doc-
trinally sufficient account of the relation of religion to American legal or political
discourse.
38. Madison relied, in part, on a theology of religious jurisdiction:
Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, "that Religion
or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of discharging it,
can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence."
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and con-
science of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these
may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable;
because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated
by their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalien-
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form a rich, thick, ideological soup that has become part of our na-
tional identity.
Madison's arguments can be debated, and either accepted or dis-
carded. But one does not have to be a raving relativist to see that, as
Americans, we no longer confront those arguments, and the nation
they helped form, as neutrals. Our nation's history might have taken
a non-Madisonian turn, and might even have worked had it done so.
But a certain complicated and inconsistent suspicion of explicitly theo-
able also; because what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the
Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage,
and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent
both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.
Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be
considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe: And if a member
of Civil Society, who enters into any subordinate Association, must always
do it with a reservation of his duty to the general authority; much more must
every man who becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, do it with
a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign. We maintain therefore
that in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of
Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.
Id. at 64. He also relied, in part, on a theology of religious anti-instrumentalism:
Because the bill implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge
of Religious truth; or that he may employ Religion as an engine of Civil
policy. The first is an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opin-
ions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world: The second an unhal-
lowed perversion of the means of salvation.
Id. at 67. And on a theology of religious self-sufficiency:
[T]he establishment proposed by the Bill is not requisite for the support of
the Christian Religion. To say that it is, is a contradiction to the Christian
Religion itself; for every page of it disavows a dependence on the powers of
this world: it is a contradiction to fact; for it is known that this Religion both
existed and flourished, not only without the support of human laws, but in
spite of every opposition from them; and not only during the period of mi-
raculous aid, but long after it had been left to its own evidence, and the
ordinary care of Providence: Nay, it is a contradiction in terms; for a Reli-
gion not invented by human policy, must have pre-existed and been sup-
ported, before it was established by human policy. It is moreover to weaken
in those who profess this Religion a pious confidence in its innate excellence,
and the patronage of its Author; and to foster in those who still reject it, a
suspicion that its friends are too conscious of its fallacies, to trust it to its
own merits.
Id. And on a theology of Christian primitivism:
Because experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of
maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary opera-
tion. During almost fifteen centuries, has the legal establishment of Christi-
anity been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places,
pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in
both, superstition, bigotry and persecution. Enquire of the Teachers of
Christianity for the ages in which it appeared in its greatest lustre; those of
every sect, point to the ages prior to its incorporation with Civil policy. Pro-
pose a restoration of this primitive state in which its Teachers depended on
the voluntary rewards of their flocks; many of them predict its downfall. On
which side ought their testimony to have greatest weight, when for or when
against their interest?
Id. at 67-68.
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logical arguments in law and public debate is now part of American
distinctiveness, as much as Trinitarianism is (arguably) part of Irish
distinctiveness. The Constitution constitutes us as much as we consti-
tute it. And to abandon Madison's experiment would be, for most of
us, not only dangerous but, pun intended, dispiriting.
Notes & Observations
